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Abstract—Web spammers are individuals who attempt to manip-
ulate the structure of the Web in such a way that a search engine
(SE) will give them higher ranking location (and thus, greater
visibility) in search results than what they would get without
manipulation. Typically, Web spammers aim to promote their
own financial, political or religious agendas exploiting the trust
that users associate with SE query results. Over the last ten years,
search engines have taken steps to defend against spammers
with some success. Arguably, Web spamming is crucial during
election times, when voters are likely to use search engines to
get information about electoral candidates. At times of elections,
spammers could succeed in spreading propaganda manipulating
SE query results of candidates’ names. In a symmetric but,
arguably, less likely scenario, SEs might influence elections by
manipulating their own results to favor one candidate over an-
other. In fact, some have suggested that SEs (Google in particular)
should be proactively regulated to avoid such a possibility. In
this paper, we investigate to what degree the SE query results
related to searches of electoral candidates names were altered by
anyone (Web spammers or SEs) during the 2016 US congressional
election, an election that saw the rise of “fake news” sites. Our
results indicate that different SEs had different degree of success
defending against spammers: Google gave preference to reliable
sources in the first 6 of the top-10 search results when queried
with the name of any electoral candidate. Also, Google did not
allow much variation in the ranking of the top-10 results and did
not allow “fake news” sites to appear at its organic results. Bing
and Yahoo, on the other hand, did not have as good a record.
This is even more apparent in the autocomplete box “suggest”
options presented to the user while forming the query.
Keywords–Search Engines; US Elections; Web Spam; Fake
News; Google; Yahoo; Bing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Web spammers are individuals who are trying to manipu-
late the structure of the Web in such a way to control search
engines ranking algorithms to give them higher ranking in
search results than what they would get without the alteration
[1]. This way, Web spammed pages will get higher visibility in
the eyes of unsuspected users searching for the targeted terms.
They do that by manipulating the SE ranking methods aiming
to influence the user’s opinion about their site’s quality. In
this respect, they behave very similarly to social propagandists
who are trying to alter a citizen’s mental trust network in ways
beneficial to the propagandist [1].
Web spam has a long history of manipulating search results
of SEs that starts with the creation of the first search engine,
back in 1995. Usually, their intentions are:
• financial: turning the attention of users to particular
products they are promoting, or gaining from online
advertisement;
• political: helping elect the candidates they support;
• religious: helping promote the religion they support.
Even though their activities are not known to most Web users,
spammers have had a significant role in the evolution of SEs
because they have forced SEs to keep changing their ranking
methods [2]. Ranking methods, such as the well known PageR-
ank [3] used to be a well-understood, studied and evaluated
set of mathematical functions of information retrieval, while
today they are a secret, fluid, complicated and intentionally
difficult to predict set of factors [4]. Since SE ranking methods
is one of the most important factor that any Web site marketer,
advertiser, or propagandist needs to understand, there is a
whole $65 billion industry that is studying them [5].
A. Background and Prior Work
Researchers have followed the election-related Web spam-
ming attempts in the past twelve years or so [6]. The first
recorded attempt was in 2006 when spammers openly called
for the promotion of negative information related to some
candidates for the senate and recorded the results online on the
myDD.com Web site. However, their initial success draw the
attention of Google that reportedly tried to defend against their
efforts, since their actions were compromising its reputation as
a reliable search engine.
In particular, [7] and [8] studied to what degree Googles
electoral search results were manipulated during the six months
prior to the 2008 and the 2010 congressional elections. Their
findings suggest that starting in 2008, Google tried to protect
its search results by reducing the weight that the PageRank al-
gorithm had on searches with queries the names of US electoral
candidates. In 2012, Google started employing a vertical split-
screen interface in which the left side of the screen contained
the organic results and the right side contained information
from its knowledge graph [9] with official information about
the candidate (see Figure 3). Bing and Yahoo have also
adopted a similar interface (e.g., see Figures 1 and 2). We
should point out that, even though Google’s electoral search
results has been studied over time, to our knowledge, Bing’s
and Yahoo’s performance to defending against spam has not
been studied in depth in the past.
Recently, some researchers have raised the possibility that
Google might secretly decide to manipulate its own results
[10]. That is, they worry that Google might be tempted to
use its ranking algorithm to support one political candidate
over another [11]. In particular, [10] has measured the pos-
sible influence that manipulated search results can have on
unsuspecting audiences. They have found that, even though
the effect of manipulation may not be large, it can have a
significant effect in close elections.
While such claims created a lot of interest from news
organizations, the realization that people’s opinion can be
influenced by search results is hardly new. Every advertiser
is well aware of the importance of their ranking, and a
whole industry, called “search engine optimization” (SEO),
has tried to increase product placement through blog posting
and even Web spamming. The SEO industry is reportedly
worth tens of billions of dollars [5]. SEOs organize conferences
and training workshops selling expertise on how one can do
exactly this type of manipulation. While the work of [10]
is focusing on a particular SE, Google, and has called for
federal regulation of its search results, one needs to examine
all major SEs for biased behavior. We argue that such a concern
is rather overstated: Google is the major SE and it would
have everything to lose by manipulating its rankings. Data
collection such as the one done for this paper could reveal
enough evidence of its manipulation and it could be done by
anyone with basic programming skills in scrapping. Further,
many people inside Google would know it and the likelihood
of a whistleblower is rather high.
Our paper’s contributions are as follows: We investigate
to what degree the SE query results related to searches of
electoral candidates’ names showed any signs of alteration by
anyone (spammers or SEs) during the six months prior to the
2016 US congressional election. This was an election that saw
the rise of “fake news” sites, and so it is doubly important to
see to what degree “fake news” stories infiltrated search results.
We also examined the number of times that “fake news” sites
(that is, sites that have been characterized as hosting “fake
news” stories by [12]), appeared in the top-10 search results
for the examined SEs.
Our results indicate that the three most commonly used
SEs, Google, Yahoo and Bing, had strikingly different degree
of success defending against spamming. Google gave consis-
tent preference to reliable and official sources in the top-6
search results when queried with the name of any electoral
candidate, and did not allow much variation in the ranking of
the top-10 results. Bing and Yahoo, on the other hand, do not
have as good a record. Their search results showed little effort
of consistency and the number of “fake news” sites appearing
in their results were higher. This was especially obvious in the
search autocomplete box ”suggest” options presented to the
user forming the query.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next
Section II describes our data collection and preparation for
analysis, Section III explains our methods, while Section IV
describes our results. Finally, Section V contains our conclu-
sion and future work.
II. DATA COLLECTION AND PREPARATION
According to the Pew Foundation [13], Google, Bing and
Yahoo have a combined market share of 98.34% with the
greater portion going to Google (79.88%). It is safe to assume
that if there was a successful attempt to manipulate SE results
before the US elections, one could detect its success by
monitoring the query results for suspicious variations during
that period in these three SEs.
For the six months prior to the November 2016 US
presidential and congressional elections, we collected query
results using as query strings the names of the two major
presidential candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, for
Bernie Sanders (because at the beginning of the data collection
he was still a contestant for the Democratic nomination) and
of 340 congressional candidates, 150 of them Republican, 142
of them Democratic, and 64 of them of smaller parties or
unaffiliated (58 independent or libertarian, and 6 local parties).
Of these candidates, 74 were running for the 34 seats in the
Senate, so we examined every senatorial candidate. We also
examined 279 candidates for the House. The latter were a
subset of the more than 2000 candidates running for the 435
seats in the House. To avoid overloading the SEs with over
2000 query requests, we selected the candidates for the first
six states, in alphabetical order: AL, AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO.
We have no reason to believe that the search results in the
remaining states would have been any different. The candidate
names were chosen from a website specializing in monitoring
the electoral candidates [14].
We used the following method to collect the data: be-
tween June 2 and November 8, 2016, on a roughly bi-
weekly basis (44 data collection dates in total), Google, Bing,
and Yahoo were queried and scraped for the top 10 results
using requests and urllib python libraries, and matching
using regular expressions for the top 10 results tags. Each
of the search results were then aggregated into files for each
candidate, as follows: for each collection date, each candidates
file contains a list of websites that appeared in the top 10 search
results, in the numerical order they appeared. For consistency
in the overall data collection, websites that did not appear in
the top-10 results for a certain date were assigned a rank of 0
for that date.
We point out an caveat in our data collection. In the middle
of the search results scraping, Bing changed its formatting a
couple of times (at least) and our algorithms collected fewer
top-10 results in a consistent fashion. The analysis we present
here is based on the earlier dates and may be incorrect for
Bing overall.
III. METHOD AND ANALYSIS
Processing the data involved the following steps: for each
candidate, we created a table with the top-10 links per date for
each of the 44 data collection dates. We wanted to know the
particular domain that a link was pointing to, instead of the
specific link within the site. To account for that, we extracted
the site domain of each link. For example, all articles from the
New York Times were represented in our data tables by the
site domain nytimes.com.
For each domain in the table, we calculated the number of
times it appeared over the whole collection period. To control
for data sparsity, we introduced the measure of website appear-
ance percentage (WAP), defined as the minimum percentage of
times a website appeared in the top-10 results over the period
of data collection. For the data reported below, we used WAP
values of 33%, 50%, 66% and 75%.
We also compute a domain’s mode, defined as the top-
10 location it appeared for a WAP percentage of the time.
Figure 1. Yahoo sample search results for Hillary Clinton on Aug. 11, 2016.
The first item is an ad, followed by recent news. Organic results start with
her official site, cnn and wikipedia. The knowledge graph’s information
appears on the RHS.
Figure 2. Bing sample search results for Hillary Clinton on Aug. 11, 2016.
For less than a particular WAP, the mode is not defined.
One way to get a sense of the usefulness of defining the
mode is to think in terms of predicting future search re-
sults for some query. Consider the following example: In
Google’s complete collection for “Hillary Clinton” the URL
item hillaryclinton.com, her official campaign site, had
a mode of 1 with a WAP of 0.75. That means that, at least 75%
of the time, searching for “Hillary Clinton” on Google resulted
in her official campaign page being first in the top 10 results.
It also means that next time we could do the same search,
at least 3 out of 4 chances is that hillaryclinton.com
will appear in the 1st position. Similarly, for the same search,
wikipedia.com’s mode was 2 and twitter.com was 3.
In summary, the higher the WAP we could define for the
modes of domains of search results, the more predictable the
ranking of search results will be in a future search, and the
less likely the search results were altered by propagandists of
the SE itself.
IV. RESULTS
Given the plethora of news, blogs and political analysis
around the time of elections, if SEs was using a dynamic
ranking method, such as straightforward PageRank, to compute
Figure 3. Google sample search results for Hillary Clinton on Aug. 11,
2016. Note that all three SEs have adopted the “knowledge graph” on the
RHS of each search, which makes them even more visible occupying a large
portion “above the fold”. For prominent candidates, the LHS may contain an
ad followed by recent news about the candidate. Our research measures the
changes in the “organic results” typically appearing under news.
the top-10 results, it would be surprising to have mode defined
at all. It is more reasonable to think that, as news was
being produced and gaining prominence in online sources,
the location of every URL item would change considerably
over time. On the other end, if SEs were using a static list of
predefined top-10 results to respond to search queries, all 10
modes would be defined over the data collection.
Of course PageRank is one of the factors that search
engines are using to rank their results. The greater the con-
tribution of PageRank in the final ranking, the less often mode
is defined. Intuitively, when for a search query we have a
large number of modes defined, say 6–10 modes per candidate
collection, we can deduce that the query results are not updated
dynamically over time as much. But if a small number of
modes were defined, say 0-4 modes, the query results are
rather dynamically altered, possibly driven by PageRank or
spammers. Finally, when 5 modes are only defined, one would
say that dynamic and static ranking methods are equally at
work.
In any case, we should also point out that it is important to
consider which modes are defined. For example, if all modes
at the top-5 locations are defined, the user will be shown
practically the same results above the fold. For users who do
not look below the fold, it would appear that search results are
not changing.
To see the significance of the number of modes defined in
some search result, consider the following scenario. Assume
that for some search engine, query results over time for some
candidate define 8 modes. That means that, since ranking does
not change a lot, the next time we are querying the search
engine for the candidate we may expect to see the same 8
URLs in the same location of the search results. So, we can
say that we can predict most of the search results. In particular,
it is very likely that the above-fold search results (often referred
as the top-5) will be the substantially same in the future.
Let us compare that scenario with another scenario of
a search engine or candidate whose search defines only 3
modes. In this case, the search result URLs will be significantly
different. If Web spammers are trying to influence the search
results this latter search engine could fall victim. To be fair, if
the 3 modes defined are the top-3, it would indicate an attempt
by a search engine to defend its search results in the locations
above the fold that are more important, while leaving the rest
to the algorithm.
Our mode of location results for our data collections are
as follows:
1) Google mode averages for different WAPs:
WAP 75% 66% 50% 33%
Overall 5.37 5.78 6.64 7.50
Democrats 5.32 5.78 6.66 7.67
Republicans 5.44 5.83 6.67 7.45
Senate 5.18 5.55 6.54 7.38
House 5.43 5.85 6.69 7.56
2) Yahoo mode averages for different WAPs:
WAP 75% 66% 50% 33%
Overall 2.67 2.92 3.28 3.21
Democrats 2.57 2.85 3.17 3.13
Republicans 2.75 2.93 3.35 3.26
Senate 2.68 2.93 3.31 3.18
House 2.65 2.89 3.26 3.19
3) Bing mode averages for different WAPs: As we men-
tioned, due to problems with scraping Bing our results are
not complete and so we will not present them here. For the
period we have complete results we can report that Bing’s
mode averages are even lower than Yahoo’s.
Our results indicate remarkably different number of modes
(and therefore, ranking methods) between Google and the other
search engines, even for the more restrictive WAP of 75%.
For Google, it is possible to define the mode of each Google
search for an average of 5.37 top-10 locations (median = 6) in
all of our 340 searches. For WAP 50% (i.e., at least half the
time) almost 7 modes are defines (6.64 to be exact). On the
other hand, in Yahoo, it is only possible to define the mode
for an average of 2.67 locations (median = 3) for WAP 75%
and 3.28 for WAP 50%. Finally, in Bing it appears that the
average is even less than Yahoo’s. In other words, users who
queried Google about a congressional candidate, they saw little
variation above-fold in their organic search results over time.
Users who queried Yahoo saw much greater variation but not
in the first 3 organic locations, while users who used Bing
saw almost always different results, except maybe in the first
location.
But which modes are defined? Not surprising, for all SEs,
the most common predicted modes were the top results, with
Bing’s being the top 2, Google’s being the top 7, and Yahoo’s
being the top 5. This shows that Google contains more websites
that are consistently appearing in the top-10 results than Yahoo
and Bing.
If spammers (or the search engines themselves) were trying
to manipulate their congressional search results, they were not
succeeding in Google. It is much more likely that they were
successful in Yahoo and, especially in Bing.
Next, we will address the question whether search engines
showed any preference to a particular party. Were there any
differences in the modes for Democratic and Republican
candidates?
The answer is no, all three SEs treated the candidates of
both parties in a similar way: Compared to the overall average
of 6.64 (for WAP = 50%), Google’s mode of Democratic
candidates was 6.66 while for Republicans was 6.67. Similarly
for Yahoo (3.17 and 3.35, respectively) and Bing.
Remarkably, the averages for Senate candidates vs. House
candidates are similarly consistent. Google’s Senatorial candi-
dates have average of 6.54 and House candidates 6.69. Yahoo’s
averages are 3.31 and 3.26, respectively.
Thus, while Google showed little alteration to its organic
search results compared to Yahoo and Bing, all three search
engines treated all candidate, Democratic or Republican, for
Senate or for House, consistently.
A. “Fake news” stories
Finally, we counted the occurrences of items from sites
that were characterized as “fake news” sites appearing in [12].
We discovered that over all SEs and over all the searches,
there were 85 “fake news” sites in Democratic candidate search
results, 139 for Republicans, and 27 for independents. Thus,
there are more appearances of “fake news” sites in search
results of Republican candidates. We should clarify that we
have done no analysis as of this writing on whether the “fake
news” items were positive or negative for the candidate, or
whether the stories were true or false. Doing so is beyond the
scope of this paper.
We then counted the number of “fake news” occurrences
per search engine. For Google, there were 68 unique stories
from sites characterized as “fake news” sites that appeared
over the six months period we studied. By contrast, there were
83 for Bing, and 95 for Yahoo. Thus, Google is less prone to
listing “fake news” sites in its top-10 results, followed by Bing
and last Yahoo. Again, we should clarify that we have done
no analysis as of this writing to see whether the “fake news”
items appearing on top-10 results were true or false (given
that not every story that appears in a “fake news” site may be
false).
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our paper studied the extent to which Google, Bing, and
Yahoo were prone to Web spamming during the last 2016 con-
gressional elections. While we cannot be sure whether anyone
tried to manipulate search results ranking for congressional
candidates, we can tell whether they were successful in altering
the ranking of the search results, if they tried.
Our results indicate that, by and large, there were no
variations of top-6 websites in Google, and only a few
“fake news” stories that appeared over the six months period
we studied in the top-10 results. On the other hand, there
was significant variation in the search results for Yahoo and
almost constant change in Bing. If spammers were trying
to manipulate search results in Yahoo and Bing, they were
more successful. We also found that all three search engines
treated similarly Democratic and Republican candidates, and
Senatorial and House candidates.
Even though the market share for Yahoo and Bing is
small, spammers can introduce biased information into the
search results, affecting the perception of candidates for users
who used these two SEs. Further evidence of the ease at
which Bing and Yahoo are manipulated by spammers can be
found [15]. Thus, we call for a thorough effort by Bing and
Yahoo to increase their defense against Web spammers. Further
investigations are needed for Yahoo and Bing data, as well as
for the nature and type of any spam that were introduced to
various demographics of candidates.
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